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This paper will analyze the relationship between pay disparity and
individual player performance in a particular team sports setting, the
National Basketball Association (NBA). NBA franchises have the choice
of setting pay levels for players with low or high degrees of pay
inequality. A policy of pay inequity within teams involves hiring a
small number of superstars (‘princes’) alongside a larger number of
less able players (‘paupers’). Alternatively, teams can hire a roster of
players who are perceived to be similarly gifted, and hence adopt a
more equitable pay structure. Our focus will be on individual response
of player productivity to changes in pay structure within teams. As we
shall show below, it appears that teams have diverged in their pay
setting policies with some franchises offering fairly equal pay
structures and others offering unequal pay scales with a mix of
princes and paupers.
The relationship between pay inequality andworker performance has
attracted much attention amongst labor economists and industrial
relations specialists. This is largely because the theoretical literature is
sharply divided as to the likely impacts of increased pay inequality on
worker performance. The seminal theoretical contributions of Lazear and
Rosen (1981) and Rosen (1986) established tournament theory in which
a salary scale that is convex in hierarchical job grades could promote
optimal effort of workers in response to perceived increase in relative
rewards through promotion. A hierarchical pay system can deliverincentives to provide effort that a uniform, egalitarian system cannot.
Moreover, a hierarchical pay structure with increased wage dispersion
over another, otherwise similar, pay structure can induce incentives for
greater effort and higher future performance, since the returns to higher
performance are increased (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).
Hicks stated the contrarian argument that “it is necessary that
there should not be strong feelings of injustice about the relative
treatment of employees since these would diminish the efficiency of
the firm”(1963, p317). This gives rise to the ‘pay compression’
hypothesis whereby increased pay inequality reduces satisfaction
over both pay and job and generates feelings of unfairness, envy and
resentment that in turn cause workers not to perform as well as they
might under a more equal salary structure. In this vein, Levine (1991)
argued that narrow wage dispersion could foster group cohesion in
organizations which in turn could raise labor productivity. In a
variation of the pay compression theory, Ramaswamy and Rowthorn
(1991) argued that workers could even interfere with and harm co-
worker productivity through ‘sabotage’ induced by adverse feelings
caused by high levels of pay dispersion. Some workers could possess
‘damage potential’ to harm co-workers. To avoid reduced group
performance and output, these workers would need to be paid an
efficiency wage so as to deter sabotage behavior.
Testing between alternative theories of the relationship between
pay dispersion and worker performance is not easy principally
because each theory is mediated through worker effort and worker
productivity. Worker effort is rarely observed and the worker
productivity is at best imprecisely observed in the employer–
employee data sets that are used in the empirical literature. Indeed,
the empirical evidence typically relates to organizational rather than
individual performance (Grund and Westergaard-Nielsen, 2008;
382 R. Simmons, D.J. Berri / Labour Economics 18 (2011) 381–388Heyman, 2005; Lallemand et al., 2004;Winter-Ebmer andWeissmüller,
1999).
A setting where individual worker productivity is more precisely
observed is professional team sports, since these typically deliver
publicly observed, disseminated and verifiable performance measures
for athletes. These performance statistics, and accompanying salary
data, are widely available for the major North American sports.
The case that we analyze in this paper is the National Basketball
Association (NBA) over the period 1990 to 2008. This League is
interesting for several reasons. First, output in the form of team wins
depends on successful team production. Each team has a small roster
of players, usually of the order of 12 to 15 ‘core’ players who take up
the majority of playing time. Just five players appear on court at any
time and teamwork is essential for success. Unlike Major League
Baseball, for example, there is relatively little inter-team player
mobility within seasons so teams have identifiable rosters of regular
players. This is important for assessing the impact of pay inequality on
worker performance. Moreover, the NBA introduced a radical new
collective bargaining agreement in 1996 that encouraged some, but
not all, teams to increase payroll inequality. This new agreement can
be viewed as a natural experiment that can be modeled using a
difference-in-difference method. Hence, an empirical relationship
between pay disparity and worker productivity can in principle be
identified.
Our paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 will address
theoretical concerns. Section 3 will introduce the models and
estimation procedures to be applied to team performance in the
NBA. This section will also show how the collective bargaining
agreement of 1996 led to a fundamental change in intra-team pay
dispersion. Section 4 will present our models of individual worker
performance while Section 5 reports the results of our estimations of
these models. Section 6 will conclude. To anticipate our primary
result, we will show increased intra-team payroll dispersion based on
predicted (not actual) salaries is associated with increased team and
player productivity. However, the 1996 collective bargaining agree-
ment had a marginally significant negative effect on player, but not
team, productivity that mitigated the positive effect of predicted
salary dispersion.
2. Theoretical concerns
One way of modeling the impact of pay structure on worker
productivity is to examine contrasting effects through a team
production framework. The analysis follows Lazear (1989) and an
adaptation of that model to the National Hockey League by Stefanec
(2010). Within a basketball franchise, higher pay will typically be
awarded to starting players on a team, with lower pay awarded to
‘benchwarmers’ or fringe players who appear less regularly. Players
can be viewed as competing, in an abstract sense, for starting or
benchwarmer positions. We need not be concerned about positional
categories, as we would in European soccer or American football, as
basketball is a fluid game in which each player has attacking an
defensive responsibilities. We assume that both the numbers of
starting positions and starting salary slots are fixed. To fix ideas, we
consider two players j and k who compete for a starting position. We
define wage disparity as the salary gap between players,wj−wk, = λ,
which is assumed to be exogenous to player productivity.
Player productivity can be thought of as having an individual
dimension and a co-operative dimension. For example, the ability to
convert shots into points is an individual attribute while the ability to
pass to teammates is a co-operative attribute. On the court, this
distinction becomes blurred since, for example, the ability to convert a
shot into points depends on how close to the basket the shot is taken,
which in turn depends on successful passes by team-mates to get the
shooter into a good position. Nevertheless, we proceed with the
distinction as a convenient abstraction.A risk-neutral basketball player has the production function f(e, h)
where e denotes individual effort while h denotes effort directed to
towards helping teammates. We assume f(0, h)= f(e, 0)=0, eN0,
hN0, feN0, fhN0 (so cooperation is mutually beneficial), feeb0 and
fhhN0 or b0. Again following Lazear (1989) and Stefanec (2010), the
individual outputs of players j and k are given by:
qj = f ej;hk
 
+ εj ð1aÞ
qk = f ek;hj
 
+ εk ð1bÞ
These equations capture the essence of player productivity in a team
sport such as basketball: player A's performance statistics depend on his
own individual effort and also the co-operative effort of his team-mates.
Similarly, the performance statistics of a team-mate B depend on his
own individual effort and also how much effort player A undertakes to
aid his performance. The players' respective outputswill also depend on
random factors (principally luck) summarized in the stochastic ε terms,
which may also include any measurement error in outputs.
The probability that player j beats player k in a contest for a
starting position is given by:
p = Pr qj N qk
 





where G[.] is the cumulative distribution function. Players incur cost
(disutility) of effort given by C(e, h) where Ce, Cee, Ch, Chh for all
players. Players maximize expected utility by choice of individual and
cooperative effort. The maximization problem is:
Maxwj + 1–p :ð Þð Þλ−C ej;hj
 
ð3Þ
Let g be the probability density function corresponding to G. From
tournament theory, the equilibrium will be Cournot–Nash and g will
be evaluated at zero. Assuming the profit function to be concave, the
first-order conditions for maximization of Eq. (2) are;
λg 0ð Þ = Ce :ð Þ= fe ej; hk
 
ð4aÞ
λg 0ð Þ = Ck :ð Þ = fh ek;hj
 
ð4bÞ
We then examine the signs of partial derivatives ∂e/∂λ and ∂h/∂λ
by comparative statics:
∂e= ∂λ = g 0ð Þfe = Cee–λg 0ð Þfee½  N 0 ð5aÞ
∂h= ∂λ = −g 0ð Þfh = Chh–λg 0ð Þfhh½ b0if Chh–λg 0ð Þfhh N 0 ð5bÞ
From Eq. (4a) we see that an increase in pay disparity (greater pay
gap) raises individual effort, given own cooperative effort and that of
teammates. This is the standard tournament result carried over to a
team production setting (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). Widening of the
salary structure motivates players to provide greater individual effort
(see Ehrenberg and Smith, 1990 and Frick and Simmons, 2008 for
applications of this proposition to individual sports such as golf and
tennis). From Eq. (4b) we observe that if the production function
exhibits diminishing returns to co-operative effort (fhhb0) then an
increase in pay disparity lowers a player's co-operative effort. As
players compete for starting positions, they engage in less co-
operative treatment of rivals resulting in lower co-operative effort,
holding individual effort constant. But, as Stefanec (2010) points out,
if instead the production function has sufficiently strong increasing
returns to cooperative effort, such that the denominator of Eq. (4b)
becomes positive, without violating second-order conditions, then
increased pay disparity results in greater co-operative effort. Then the
Table 1
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will break down.
The foregoing theory applies to player choice of effort in two
dimensions, individual and co-operative. It ignores several confound-
ing factors. First, firms make selection choices in their hiring policies,
including choice of drafted young players from college. Players are not
randomly assigned to teams and teams choose their levels of pay
disparity through the mix of free agents and drafted players in the
composition of the team roster. We assume that the teams select their
pay disparity levels through the notion of a ‘pay structure’ and that
players are able to some extent to vary their performance (produc-
tivity) levels in response to an exogenous degree of pay disparity.
Second, we abstract from dynamic concerns emanating from use of
multi-period contracts. These dynamic concerns could include
shirking behavior immediately after signing a long-term contract
(Berri and Krautmann, 2006). The previous model ignored inter-
temporal allocations of effort over a long contract period. Third, we
have not considered the particular NBA institutional feature of a soft
salary cap. This may reduce pay disparities below levels intended by
team owners.
3. Team performance and pay inequality in the NBA
The theoretical model above suggests that the impact of payroll
disparity should be observed on the performance of individual
players. The empirical literature on the subject [see DeBrock et al.
(2004) and Depken (2000) on baseball, Frick et al. (2003) on the four
major North American sports, Berri and Jewell (2004) on basketball,
Mondello and Maxcy (2009) on the National Football League, Franck
and Nüesch (2010, forthcoming) on German soccer and Gomez
(2002), Kahane (forthcoming), Sommers (1998) and Stefanec (2010)
on the National Hockey League], though, has often examined the issue
of pay disparity in professional sports at the team level.2 Of these
papers, all but DeBrock et al. (2004) and Kahane (forthcoming) use an
unconditional measure of wage inequality.3 But the hypotheses in the
literature point to a need to investigate whether changes in intra-
team pay inequality lead to changes in team performance for a given
quality of co-workers (teammates) in the team. For this purpose, we
need a conditional measure of pay inequality that controls for the
quality of a worker's teammates (Winter-Ebmer and Weissmüller,
1999; Lallemand et al., 2004).4 Such a measure can be extracted from
a salary model.
In this section we estimate a team-based model of pay inequality
and performance. We begin with a simple salary model for player i in
year t:
Log salary = α0 + α1Xit1 + year effects + εit ð6Þ
where Xit−1 is a vector of observable player skills and attributes at the
season prior to assessment of salary and α1 is a vector of
characteristics to be estimated. The predicted part of the estimates
of Eq. (6) is used to generate a Gini measure of pay inequality for each2 In an interesting variation on this literature, Katayama and Nuch (forthcoming)
model the impact of salary dispersion on team performance in the NBA at game level.
They find, in line with Berri and Jewell (2004), no effect of within-team pay disparity
on team performance, using estimation methods similar to this paper.
3 DeBrock et al. (2004) use a Herfindahl index to measure pay inequality while
Kahane (forthcoming) uses standard deviation and inter-quartile range.
4 Winter-Ebmer and Weissmüller (1999) used ‘standardised’ wages as a proxy for
worker productivity. An inverted U-shaped relationship was found between condi-
tional wage dispersion and worker productivity for white-collar workers while there
was a positive relationship between pay dispersion and worker productivity for blue-
collar workers. The study by Lallemand et al. (2004) was at firm level with profits per
employee as proxy for firm performance. There results point to a positive relationship
between this measure of firm performance and conditional pay inequality. In our
sports application we can measure team and worker performance directly without the
need for proxies.team-year, GINI PREDICTEDjt where j suffix denotes a team. The
residuals from estimates of Eq. (6) represent differences between
actual salary and expected salaries. These differences could arise
either from unobserved quality or could reflect overpaid or underpaid
players but we are unable to distinguish these two effects (DeBrock
et al., 2004). The residuals are used to compute a second measure of
pay inequality, GINI RESIDUALjt.. An increase in GINI PREDICTED implies
an increase in dispersion of expected salaries while an increase in GINI
RESIDUAL indicates a greater dispersion of salaries around their
expected values.
Our two measures of pay inequality are then inserted into a model
of team performance, here measured by regular season win percent:
Winpercentjt = β0 + β1Zjt + β2GINI PREDICTEDjt
+ β3GINIRESIDUALjt + Teameffects + νjt
ð7Þ
In the estimation of our player salary model we need reliable
measures of player productivity. We could have used a composite
measure of productivity. The conventional measure of productivity
used by the National Basketball Association is NBA EFFICIENCY and this
is the sum of player positive statistics, comprised as points, rebounds,
steals, assists and blocked shots, minus the sum of performance
metrics that reduce wins (turnovers and missed shots). Berri (1999,
2008) points out that this measure imposes equal weights on each
performance statistic and overvalues the positive impact of inefficient
scoring.
Despite the problems with NBA EFFICIENCY, it does a surprisingly
good job of explaining the variation in NBA salaries. Berri et al. (2007),
though, noted that one can explain slightly more by employing
specific individual productivity variables. Specifically, we find –
essentially consistent with Berri et al. (2006, 2007) and Berri and
Schmidt (2010) – that salaries can be explained with per game
measures of points, rebounds, blocks and assists (shooting efficiency,
turnovers, and steals tend not to explain player salaries in the NBA).
To these variables we add age, age squared, minutes per game to
capture variation in playing time (we predict that players who remain
on court for longer periods will be rewarded with greater salary) and
win percent of the team that the player was contracted to in the
previous season. These are all observable and known attributes of
players. We deliberately exclude player fixed effects as these
represent unobservable characteristics. We do include year effects
to capture salary inflation in the NBA, which was considerably greater
than consumer price inflation over the period examined, 1990 to
2008. We confine the sample of players to those who have at least 20
games per season and 12 min per game in a given season. This filter,
applied throughout the paper, eliminates fringe players who
contribute little to team wins. The estimated salary model is shown
in Table 1 and is similar to that estimated by Berri et al. (2007) and
Krautmann et al. (2009).Salary model for NBA players 1990/01 to 2007/08. Dependent variable: log salary.
Variable Coefficient (absolute t statistic)
Age 0.369 (10.97)
Age squared −0.0058 (9.82)
Points per game 0.043 (13.76)
Rebounds per game 0.055 (9.30)
Blocks per game 0.193 (9.58)
Assists per game 0.026 (4.07)
Minutes per game 0.014 (4.76)
Team win percent 0.571 (8.48)
Year dummies Yes
Adjusted R2 0.606
Note: The null hypothesis of equal coefficients on defensive and offensive rebounds
could not be rejected so these are combined into total rebounds. All performance
measures are lagged one season.
Table 3
Gini coefficients by NBA team.
Team 1990–2007 1990–1995 1996–2007
Atlanta* 0.411 0.277 0.479
Boston 0.411 0.337 0.449
Charlotte 0.356 0.326 0.374
Chicago* 0.403 0.338 0.435
Cleveland* 0.411 0.395 0.419
Dallas* 0.385 0.343 0.406
Denver* 0.398 0.333 0.430
Detroit 0.314 0.275 0.334
Golden State 0.377 0.385 0.373
Houston* 0.442 0.388 0.470
Indiana* 0.386 0.334 0.412
Los Angeles Clippers 0.343 0.312 0.359
Los Angeles Lakers* 0.442 0.274 0.527
Miami* 0.442 0.356 0.485
Memphis 0.350
Milwaukee 0.353 0.273 0.393
Minnesota 0.427 0.342 0.469
New Jersey 0.426 0.363 0.458
New Orleans 0.422
New York 0.373 0.378 0.370
Orlando* 0.419 0.330 0.463
Philadelphia 0.402 0.381 0.412
Phoenix 0.425 0.362 0.456
Portland* 0.348 0.279 0.383
Sacramento* 0.380 0.295 0.422
San Antonio 0.415 0.384 0.431
Seattle* 0.393 0.277 0.451
Toronto 0.348
Utah* 0.389 0.292 0.438
Vancouver 0.371 0.380
Washington* 0.426 0.387 0.445
All 0.395 0.334 0.423
Note: * denotes a treatment team as defined in the text.
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using RELATIVE SALARY, defined as total payroll of a team divided by
the League average team payroll in a given season thus centering the
metric at a mean of 1. We hypothesize that teams may encounter
diminishing returns in win percent to team payroll (quality) and so
introduce a squared term in RELATIVE SALARY to allow for this
possibility (Simmons and Forrest, 2004). Our estimatedmodel of team
performance is shown in Table 2, column (1).
In this model, the coefficients of RELATIVE SALARY and RELATIVE
SALARY SQUARED are significantly positive and negative, respectively, in
line with the diminishing returns hypothesis and consistent with
Simmons and Forrest (2004). Themeasure of pay inequality taken from
predicted (expected) salaries has a positive and significant coefficient.
Essentially, this result shows that NBA teams which employ a roster of
players that are more unequal in talent (as proxied by market salaries)
perform better in the regular season than teams that are more equal in
quality. This finding is the complete opposite of the result of DeBrock
et al. (2004). These authors estimated a comparable model to ours for
Major League Baseball and obtained a significant negative coefficient on
their measure of predicted pay inequality.
3.1. The 1995 collective bargaining agreement
The 1995 collective bargaining agreement between players and
team owners in the National Basketball Association brought about a
radical change in pay equity. This bargaining agreement raised the
team cap on payrolls to 45% of eligible league revenues as from the
1996 close season. It also eliminated the right of teams to match offers
from other organizations to their own free agents. Hence, all free
agents without a contract at the conclusion of the 1995–96 season
were free to negotiate and sign with any team in the NBA. As a result,
several teams began the summer in 1996 with relatively empty
rosters and large amounts of money to spend on the acquisition of
talent. Several teams opted to spend their money on a few star
athletes, the NBA ‘princes’. Having acquired these stars, teams filled
the remaining places in their rosters with NBA ‘paupers’, many of
whom were prepared to play for the NBA minimum wage on offer.
This minimum wage still exceeded these players' reservation wages.
Hill and Groothuis (2001) presented evidence that the distribution
of salaries in the NBA became increasingly unequal after 1996. They
did so using basic descriptive statistics: standard deviation, skewness,
kurtosis and Gini coefficient. All of these measures showed a more
unequal salary distribution immediately after the 1995–96 season.
Table 3 reports unconditional Gini coefficients for NBA teams over the
whole sample period and over the 1990–96 and 1996–2008
subperiods. Focusing on the average Gini coefficients for 1994–95
and 1995–96 on the one hand, and 1996–97 and 1997–98 on the
other, we find an increase in mean Gini coefficient across all teams
from 0.336 to 0.411. We also observe that 15 out of 29 teams
experienced an increase in Gini coefficient of at least 20% betweenTable 2







Relative salary 0.648 (5.78) 0.616 (5.58)
Relative salary squared −0.169 (4.12) −0.159 (3.97)
Gini predicted 0.474 (5.36) 0.494 (5.08)
Gini residual −0.038 (0.50) −0.054 (0.72)
Post 1996 −0.024(0.95)
Treat*post 1996 −0.024 (0.68)
Team fixed effects Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.343 0.343
N 516 5031994 and 1998; some of these teams had very large increases in pay
inequality, most notably Atlanta, Chicago and Los Angeles Lakers. This
substantial increase in salary inequality for around half of NBA teams
is a valuable aid to identification of impacts of changes in pay
inequality on player performance.
Some teams restructured playing rosters and contracts so as to
generate increased pay inequality. We propose to term these teams,
denotedbyasterisk in Table 3, as ‘treated’ teamswhichare codedas ‘1’ in
the dummy variable, TREAT. The remaining teams are correspondingly
‘untreated’; these are teams which decided not to raise pay inequality
around the 1996 period. Another dummy variable, POST 1996, is coded
as ‘1’ for all seasons from 1996/97 onwards and 0 otherwise.
Without inclusion of control variables to allow for potentially
confounding factors, we can observe the differences inmean differences
between treated and untreated teams before and after the 1996
watershedwhen thenewcollective bargainingagreementwas enforced.
These differences are shown in Table 4. If we use a pair of broad time
periods for comparison, 1990–95 and 1996–2007, we see that the raw
difference-in-difference estimate of variation inwin percent attributable
to the newCBA is−0.036. However, if a narrower time period is chosen,
1994–96 and 1996–98, with two seasons either side of the new union
agreement, we find a much less difference-in-difference estimate of
0.002, effectively zero. The larger negative estimate in the broader time
periods is probably picking up other changes in the basketball players'
labor market, such as variations in salary cap rules.
We can estimate the treatment effect from a team-level regression
as follows:
Winpercentjt = β0 + β1Zjt + β2GINI PREDICTEDjt
+ β3GINIRESIDUALjt + β4TREATjt + β5POST 1996jt
+ β6TREAT  POST 1996jt + Teameffects + νjt ð8Þ
Table 4
Treatment effects on team and player performance.
Teams: win percent 1990–95 1996–2007 Δ 1994–95 1996–97 Δ
Treated 0.513 0.498 −0.015 0.542 0.530 −0.012
Untreated 0.484 0.505 0.021 0.452 0.466 −0.014
Difference −0.029 0.007 −0.036 −0.090 −0.064 0.002
Players: ADJP48
Treated 0.328 0.301 −0.027 0.322 0.296 −0.026
Untreated 0.319 0.281 −0.038 0.294 0.273 −0.021
Difference 0.009 0.020 0.011 −0.028 −0.023 −0.005
385R. Simmons, D.J. Berri / Labour Economics 18 (2011) 381–388In Eq. (8), TREAT*POST 1996 is an interaction term between treated
teams (those that were substantially affected by the collective
bargaining agreement through a change in pay policy) and the post-
1996 period dummy. The coefficient on this variable then registers the
difference-in-difference estimate of treatment of teams before and
after the collective bargaining watershed.
Regression estimates of Eq. (8) are reported in column (2) of
Table 2. We find no significant treatment effect. Varying the selection
of treated teams, e.g. by making the required increase in Gini
coefficient to be 10% rather than 20%, thereby adding two extra
teams (Detroit and San Antonio), does not affect the result. Overall,
the extra variables in Eq. (8) fail to add significant explanatory power
to those in Eq. (7). Hence, the impact of increased pay inequality on
team performance cannot be identified from our suggested natural
experiment. Of course, the ‘experiment’ here is somewhat unusual in
that we are imposing investigators' judgement on what constitutes a
substantial change in team pay inequality. In most natural experi-
ments in economics, the changed is externally driven as in law
changes across states or countries.
It is possible that variations in pay dispersion could affect team
performance (win percent) directly through some collective team
effort effect; successful teams may generate powerful synergies from
their players. In this respect, the team-based approach presented thus
far is of interest. But the hypotheses surrounding impact of pay
inequality on performance– envy, team cohesion, emulation, pro-
spects of tournament-type rewards and so on- are fundamentally
about workers' responses to pay structures.
A worker-level approach can take advantage of the immense data
on player productivity available to researchers in professional sports.
The team (firm) outcomes observed in sports are entirely a function of
the actions the players take upon the field of play. The player's actions
are in turn a function of a list of factors that includes a player's talent, aTable 5
The impact of various player and team statistics on wins in the NBA.
Player variables Coefficient
Three point field goal made 0.0644
Two point field goal made 0.0318
Free throw made 0.0176
Missed field goal −0.0334









Opponent's three point field goals made −0.0641
Opponent's two point field goal made −0.0317
Opponent's turnovers 0.0333
Team turnover −0.0334
Team rebounds 0.0333player's age, the productivity of teammates – and as the literature
suggests – the level of pay disparity on the team. The impact of this
latter factor, though, is unclear. Hence the need for a properly
designed empirical investigation that focuses on individual worker
productivity. The next section takes up this theme.
4. Modeling player performance in the National
Basketball Association
Using data from 1987 to 2007, Berri (2008) offered an alternative
metric to NBA EFFICIENCY – which we will label PROD –– in which the
weights on each performance statistic are derived from a regression of
team wins on the full set of player performance statistics. The
coefficients from this regression – shown in Table 5 – are used to
compile PROD. This reveals that three point field goals made and
offensive and defensive rebounds have higher weights among the
positive performance statistics than blocked shots and free throws
made. One should note that PROD is adjusted for the set of team
statistics reported in Table 5. To allow for variations in playing time, a
further adjustment is made by calculating player performance per
48 min. This gives our dependent variable for player performance,
ADJP48. A version of this productivity metric has been applied in a
number of studies of player performance in basketball (e.g. Berri and
Krautmann, 2006; Berri et al., 2006, 2009; Berri and Schmidt, 2010;
Price and Wolfers, 2010).
Our full model of player performance in the NBA is:
ADJP48it = γ0 + γ′1Xit + γ2GINI PREDICTEDjt + γ3GINIRESIDUALjt
+ γ4TREATjt + γ5TREAT  POST 1996jt + θi
+ team dummies + εi
ð6Þ
ADJP48 is our player performance metric just described. Included
in the X vector of control variables are lagged ADJP48, AGE and AGE
SQUARED. We include a dummy variable, NEWTEAM, to denote
whether a player moved between teams between beginning ofTable 6
Descriptive statistics: mean (standard deviation).
Variable Whole sample Pre-1996 Post-1996
Player productivity 0.299 0.314 0.293
(0.121) (0.123) (0.120)
Team productivity 0.099 0.100 0.099
(0.032) (0.034) (0.031)
Age 27.98 27.91 28.01
(3.89) (3.34) (4.11)
Total games 135.0 141.6 132.0
(23.6) (21.1) (24.0)
Roster stability 0.692 0.732 0.674
(0.156) (0.147) (0.157)
Gini 0.394 0.332 0.422
(0.097) (0.079) (0.092)
Gini predicted 0.276 0.280 0.274
(0.078) (0.091) (0.071)
Gini residuals 0.262 0.249 0.268
(0.075) (0.071) (0.076)
Table 7
Individual performance regressions, dependent variable is ADJP48.
Variable (1) Pooled OLS (2) Fixed effects (3) Fixed effects (4) Fixed effects: players
present in 1995 and 1996
ADJP48 t−1 0.136 (6.26) 0.183 (5.74)
Age −0.0081 (1.30) 0.044 (7.46) 0.036 (6.26) 0.033 (4.43)
Age squared 0.00016 (1.50) −0.00084 (8.16) −0.00069 (6.94) −0.00060 (4.92)
Total games 0.0012 (13.58) 0.0007 (9.44) 0.0006 (8.74) 0.0006 (6.53)
Change team 0.013 (1.66) 0.017 (3.32) 0.011 (3.43) 0.015 (2.25)
Roster stability 0.083 (6.24) 0.021 (2.71) 0.018 (2.35) 0.018 (1.74)
Team productivity −0.698 (10.15) −0.110 (2.41) −0.104 (2.39) −0.130 (2.15)
Gini predicted 0.197 (6.97) 0.036 (1.96) 0.035 (2.00) 0.039 (1.75)
Gini residuals −0.025 (0.94) 0.016 (1.00) 0.019 (1.15) 0.025 (1.14)
Treat 0.019 (0.77)
Treat*Post 1996 −0.013 (1.88)
Team effects No Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Player effects No Yes Yes Yes
N (observations) 3871 3871 3871 1969
N (players) 802 802 802 270
R2 0.085 0.252 0.358 0.353
5 Ordinary least squares estimation with a lagged dependent variable and a serially
correlated error term will lead to inconsistent parameter estimates. Consistent
estimators can be obtained by instrumental variables estimation of the parameters of a
first-difference model, where lags of regressors are used as instruments. This is the
Arellano-Bond estimator, available in Stata 11 software (Arellano and Bond, 1991;
Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). We applied this dynamic difference GMM estimator to
the models in Table 6, columns (3) and (4). We note the risk of biased results from this
estimator where instruments are weak (Blundell and Bond, 1998) and so we also used
a dynamic difference system estimator. These two dynamic panel data estimators gave
unsatisfactory results in different ways. In the Arellano-Bond approach, the Sargan test
of over-identification restrictions rejected the null on each variant of lag structure of
endogenous variable(s). In the systems GMM approach, the model delivered very few
significant coefficients on our control variables and the coefficient on lagged
productivity was also insignificant. In neither approach were the coefficients on
either GINI PREDICTED or GINI RESIDUAL statistically significant.
6 Berri and Schmidt (2010) report that performance peaks in the NBA at age 24.
These authors, though, examined performance from 1977 to 2008. We suspect that the
slightly later peak in our sample is due to improvement in player training and
conditioning methods over time. This allows players to maintain peak performance
longer.
386 R. Simmons, D.J. Berri / Labour Economics 18 (2011) 381–388previous season and beginning of current season. We also include a
variable to denote the sum of playing experience over the last two
seasons, TOTAL GAMES. This variable helps control for the extent and
frequency of player injuries. Our X vector contains an additional
variable, ROSTER STABILITY. This captures team stability; we identify
the set of players who appeared for a team in both current and prior
seasons. We then compute the average of percentage of teamminutes
accounted by these consistent roster members. ROSTER STABILITY is
then the average of the percentages of playing time of these players
over the current and prior seasons. We hypothesize that a teamwith a
stable group of players who interact regularly on the court will better
incorporate learning and peer effects compared to a team with a
greater roster turnover. Players who regularly play together will learn
and anticipate each other's moves thus facilitating more shots and
points earned in a game. Our prior is that increased ROSTER STABILITY
is associated with increased player performance.
In addition to ROSTER STABILITY, we have a measure of teammate
productivity, TMWP48, defined as team wins minus the contribution
of a particular player given by ADJP48. This eliminates the ‘reflection
problem’ by which team productivity across all players is affected by a
particular player's productivity (Manski, 1993). Basketball teams have
small rosters, as only five players take the court at any time, so
removing player i from the team productivity measure is particularly
important.
In basketball, shot attempts in a game are finite; if a player takes
more shots, his teammates must take fewer shots since only one ball
and limited playing time. The same argument applies to rebounds and
steals, which also contribute to player productivity. To some extent,
peer effects of teammates on player productivity are already captured
by ROSTER STABILITY. But with diminishing returns, a player's
productivity will fall if he plays on a better team since his teammates
are contributing a greater amount to the total team effort. Hence, it is
possible that increased teammate productivity will lead to reduced
individual productivity in basketball. Berri and Krautmann (2006)
offer evidence, albeit with marginal significance, that such a negative
effect exists in basketball.
We use the two intra-team Gini coefficients derived earlier from
salary equations, GINI PREDICTED and GINI RESIDUAL, as our measures
of pay inequality. As in our model of team performance we introduce
TREAT and TREAT*POST 1996 to test for effects of the 1995 Collective
Bargaining Agreement on player performance via the same set of
teams in TREAT as for the team-based model. A set of player, team
and year fixed effects completes the model. Table 6 shows
descriptive statistics for our sample of basketball players, prior to
inclusion of lags.5. Empirical results of individual performance models
Table 7 reports our regression results. Column (1) begins with a set
of pooled OLS estimates, in which GINI PREDICTED has a positive
coefficient that is significant at the 1 percent level. At this stage, we
exclude lagged performance and also take no account of the structural
break in 1996. The model is estimated over the full sample of eligible
players who had 20 games and 12 min per game in a given season.
Column (2) brings in player fixed effects, which are clearly significant.
Column (3) then adds lagged performance, where we find that a
single lag of performance delivers a significant coefficient, showing
some persistence in performance.5
Turning to our set of control variables, AGE and AGE SQUARED
deliver significant coefficients, positive and negative in line with
priors Moreover, performance in basketball is maximized at 26 years
of age which appears plausible and as such gives us greater confidence
in our model.6 As would be predicted, TOTAL GAMES has a significant
positive effect on player productivity. Players who appear in more
games deliver better performances, suggesting an element of
rationality in team selection decisions. ROSTER STABILITY has a
significant, positive effect on player productivity, as predicted. We
interpret this as suggesting that team chemistry has spillover effects
on player performance.
However, when we control for what teammates do on the court in
their performances, we find a significant negative effect of teammate
productivity, TMWP48, on player performance. Literature on peer
effects from other sports (baseball, as shown by Gould and Winter
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sports, from supermarket checkout operators (Mas and Moretti,
2009) points to positive effects of teammate or co-worker productiv-
ity on individual worker performance. Our contrary result can be
rationalized by the fact that there is only one ball in basketball and
limited playing time. In basketball as noted above, scoring opportu-
nities are both finite and constrained by teammates. Hence, it is
plausible for basketball- unlike baseball- that increased productivity
for one player will diminish the opportunities, and productivity of
others. Our result also suggests that a superstar in our data set such as
Michael Jordan, who dominated the game statistically during his
career, did not positively impact the productivity of his teammates (as
noted in Berri et al., 2006).
Turning to our focus variables, GINI PREDICTED and GINI RESIDUAL,
we find contrasting effects of pay inequality on player productivity.
Increases in GINI PREDICTED appear to lead to greater player
performance, while changes in GINI RESIDUAL have no effect. We
would argue that GINI PREDICTED can be thought of as “justified
inequality”. In other words, if a player is on a team with players he
perceives to be better, he will accept that salaries should be unequal.
In contrast, GINI RESIDUAL can be thought of as “unjustified
inequality”, which could generate perceptions of envy and fairness
that in turn induce diminished player effort and performance.
Our results indicate that “justified inequality” – or playing with
players who are perceived to be much better – makes a player better.
Recall that we have found that diminishing returns exists in the NBA.
So better teammates should make a player offer less. Salaries, though,
are primarily driven by scoring. In other words, although salaries
capture perceptions of performance, they do not fully capture
productivity [see Berri et al. (2006, 2007) and Berri-Schmidt
(2006)]. Consequently, our results indicate that when a player
perceives his teammates are better, he plays better.
There is no significant effect of conditional pay dispersion on
player performance. The fixed effects model with lagged performance
reveals a significant, positive effect of predicted pay dispersion on
player performance. Player productivity is positively related to
dispersion of expected salaries. Players in teams that have greater
salary dispersion measures perform better than comparable players
on teams with more uniform dispersion. This result is consistent with
emulation effects (players aspire to the performance levels of highly
paid stars) or tournament-type incentives (players are motivated by a
less uniform structure to perform better so as to earn more lucrative
contracts). Our results do not give any support to the cohesion and
morale effects supposedly induced by a more uniform or ‘fairer’ pay
structure.
To test for the particular effects of the change in collective
bargaining regime imposed in 1996, we first return to examination of
differences in means between players on treated and untreated teams
before and after 1996. The results, shown in the bottom panel of
Table 4, point to an impact of the change in bargaining regime on
player performance that is zero, regardless of time window selected
for comparison.
Turning to a regression analysis of the change in bargaining regime,
we undertake two modifications of the fixed effects model with lagged
performance. First, beginningwith themodel in (column (3) of Table 7),
we interact the Gini variables, GINI PREDICTED and GINI RESIDUALwith
the post-1996 dummy variable, POST 1996 and re-estimate the model
over the full sample. These interaction terms (not reported to save
space) yield insignificant coefficients and fail to add significant
explanatory power to the model. The descriptive statistics in Table 6
show why. Quite simply, although the unconditional Gini coefficient
rises after 1996, GINI PREDICTED, derived from expected salaries does
not. Actually, thismeasure shows a slightmean reduction after 1996. So
expected salaries adjusted to the new bargaining regime in such a way
that the degree of pay inequality attached to these predicted salaries
remained unchanged.Second, we apply a difference-in-difference methodology similar
to that used in the team performance model by adding the dummy
variables TREAT and TREAT*POST 1996 with estimation over the
restricted sub-sample of players who were present in both 1995 and
1996. TREAT has an insignificant coefficient so players on ‘treated’
teams are no more or less productive than players with similar
attributes on non-treated teams. But the coefficient on TREAT*POST
1996 is negative and significant at the 10 percent level. This is
tentative evidence that the change in bargaining regime implemented
in 1996 may have reduced player productivity for players employed
by teams that had substantial changes in pay structure resulting in
greater observed pay inequality. This result must be considered
alongside the similarly marginally significant coefficient on GINI
PREDICTED and also the very small effects shown in the differences in
means in Table 4. The effect of the implementation of the new
bargaining agreement was then to offset the positive effect of
increased pay dispersion based on predicted salaries.
6. Conclusions
The key questions posed in this paper were: Does increasing
disparity in salary impact team and worker performance positively or
negatively? Our answers focus on a specific natural experiment from
the NBA. In the 1990s a number of teams dramatically increased their
level of salary inequality. Did this increase in inequality impact the
performance of individual players or their teams?
To address our questions we first looked at the factors that
determine salary in the NBA. As has been demonstrated previously in
the literature, we find that player salary in the NBA is primarily driven
by points scored. Fundamental factors that determine team wins (i.e.
shooting efficiency, rebounds, and turnovers) are less important for
player salaries. In sum, there appears to be a difference between
teams' perceptions of productivity and a player's actual production of
wins in the determination of player salaries. Understanding what
factors determine player salaries allows us to examine inequality from
two perspectives. The first perspective - “justified inequality” – is
derived from an estimation of inequality taken from predicted salaries
out of our model of player salaries. We suspect that players might
accept the notion that some players are better than others; and that
players who are perceived to be better should be paid more money,
with no response in terms of individual player effort and productivity.
The other component of pay inequality, though, is what we call
“unjustified inequality”, or inequality not justified by and conditional
upon perceptions of performance embedded in our model of salary
determination. This measure of conditional pay inequality is derived
from the residuals of our salary model.
When we looked across the entire time period examined, justified
inequality did not appear to change very much. In particular, the
effects of the natural experiment of a radical change in collective
bargaining agreement implemented in 1996 were primarily to raise
unjustified (conditional) pay inequality.
Interestingly, though, both team and player performances appear
to respond positively to changes in justified inequality based on
expected salaries over the whole sample period.. We interpret these
results as confirmation of tournament theory. But one can also argue
that if a player plays with teammates he perceives as better, he will
also perform better. This aspect of teammate interaction deserves
greater attention in future research and team sports offer useful
settings in which to pursue this analysis.
Our results with respect to unjustified (conditional inequality) are
somewhat harder to interpret. Previous literature from team sports
suggests that changes in unjustified inequality has impacts on team
performance via the response of player performances, possibly driven
by concerns over ‘fairness’ in the salary distribution. Our contribution
in this paper has been to examine the relationship between pay
inequality at both individual and team levels, and our focus on the
388 R. Simmons, D.J. Berri / Labour Economics 18 (2011) 381–388player level is new here. But, although we looked at the role of
conditional pay inequality in performances at the team and player
levels we failed to find any impact at all, regardless of choice of
empirical estimator.
All of this suggests that the natural experiment that initially caught
our attention was not as important as first suggested by the sharp
increases we found in observed total Gini coefficients for many teams.
The changes in pay inequality we observed in the mid-1990s did not
affect the basic argument suggested above. Using a difference-in-
difference methodology we found no evidence of any difference in
mean differences of either team or player productivity. We suggest
that teams successfully accommodated the 1996 change in collective
bargaining agreement by making changes in team composition that
widened actual pay inequality without affecting pay inequality based
on expected salaries that are in derived from perceptions of player
performance. Although actual pay inequality widened for many
teams, pay inequality based on predicted salaries did not fundamen-
tally change.
We also found little evidence of a role for conditional pay
inequality in either team or player performances. In contrast, justified
inequality appears to have a positive impact on player performance in
the NBA. This result holds both before and after the natural
experiment that the NBA conducted. We suggest that players in the
NBA – across the entire time period examined – behave in a fashion
consistent with tournament theory.
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